Lee's Slave Hunters.

I have just come across a Ted Alexander's 2001 North and South article entitled "A Regular Slave Hunt." This article highlights a sad and little known aspect of Lee's Gettysburg campaign. Alexander wrote that in June and July 1863 Confederate forces rounded up hundreds of free blacks and escaped slaves throughout southern Pennsylvania.

Alexander has provided evidence, eyewitness testimony, to show that Confederate forces participated and what amounted to slave hunting. Some of the most disturbing evidence came from Rachel Cormany, who left a detailed account of some of the abductions. Cormany wrote: "[Confederates] were hunting up the contrabands [escaped slaves] and driving them off by droves. O! how it grated on our hearts to have to sit quietly and look at such brutal deeds--I saw no men among the contrbands--all women and children. Some of the colored people who were raised here were taken along--I sat on the front step as they were driven by just like we would drive cattle...One woman was pleading wonderfully with her driver for her children--but all the sympathy she received from him was a rough "March along"--at which she quickened her pace again." Alexander was not precise about how many blacks were captured by Confederates; an estimate for Chambersburg places its count at 250 and an estimate for York states that a little more than 100 were abducted in this town.

Alexander went on the state that most of the Confederates who participated in these kidnappings were guerrilla forces who "operated on the fringes of Lee's army." He did provide evidence that General James Longstreet knew about these abductions and that the famed General George Pickett's division participated in the kidnappings. Alexander, however, left some rather important questions unanswered. Were the orders to abduct free blacks and escaped slaves general orders or were they issued independently of the high command? To what extent did Lee's regular forces participate in the kidnappings? We know that Pickett's division participated, but did others do the same? This is a disturbing aspect of the Gettysburg campaign that deserves to be fully examined, but, unfortunately, Alexander's article leaves us with more questions than answers.

Thesis 4/24/2008

I have been thinking about how I can narrow my thesis topic down and make it more manageable. As I have said, I am going to be looking at the the US Officer Corps and trying to explain how this group developed a unique sense of community. I have begun to think that I should focus on the role the written word played in developing this community. I will be drawing upon Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities, which deals with nationalism, but I think that some of his arguments can be applied to the US Officer Corps. I hope to have another update soon.

Theodore Roosevelt and the 1912 Election

Historian Lewis Gould's Four Hats in the Ring: The 1912 Election and the Birth of Modern American Politics offers a much needed revision of this presidential campaign. Gould contends that TR lost the Republican nomination and then the general election due to mistakes made by himself and not his opponents.

Gould writes:

"The contest between Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft for the Republican presidential nomination culminated in one of the most tumultuous and controversial national conventions in all of the nation’s history. A key participant said of the scene in the Chicago Coliseum during those June days that for the Republicans “a parting of the ways was imminent” and so it proved. Taft won the nomination, Roosevelt bolted, and Democrat Woodrow Wilson gained the presidency. According to the main story line about this convention, a popular, progressive Roosevelt, eager to promote the New Nationalism, yielded to the public clamor for his selection and became a declared candidate for the GOP nomination during the winter of 1912. “My hat is in the ring,” he told a reporter. An inept, befuddled Taft, a pawn of party conservatives, faced down the Roosevelt challenge. The incumbent president did not do it with skill. He won in the end through parliamentary muscle and control of the party machinery."

"By all rights, this narrative runs, Roosevelt should have been the Republican nominee. Outraged at having the prize snatched from his grasp by trickery and deceit, Roosevelt bolted, formed his third party, and insured Republican defeat. This story line owes much to the pioneering research of George E. Mowry in Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement (1946) which relied on the Theodore Roosevelt Papers as its main source."

"The story has been compelling because much of it fits the facts. In its dramatic simplicity, however, it misses the dilemmas that the Republicans faced in 1912. By giving Roosevelt the sole starring role in the saga, it depicts the political loser as the winner, and thus understates Taft’s skill as a party politician. That Roosevelt made a series of mistakes and unwise decisions gets overlooked. It also leaves out the crucial contributions of Senator Robert M. La Follette to the ultimate triumph of the Republican conservatives. In a battle that foreshadowed the campaigning style of the future, Roosevelt and his allies missed chance after chance to seize control of the Grand Old Party. The consequences of their missteps would shape American politics for decades."

"To understand how the Chicago convention turned out as it did, it is necessary to recognize the superior skill of President Taft in winning renomination. The portly chief executive is often portrayed as a genial boob, but in this case he grabbed the initiative from Roosevelt in mid-1911 and never lost it. His personal secretary, Charles D. Hilles, began rounding up delegate commitments within the GOP during the summer of 1911 and continued through a nationwide tour that Taft made in the autumn of that year. The two men also recognized the key role of the Republican National Committee and solidified Taft’s dominance of its membership in December. Their strategy emerges in the Hilles Papers at Yale University which, when opened in the 1960s, provided detailed evidence of Taft’s strategy. This crucial collection has, however, been little consulted by previous historians of this election."

"Meanwhile, Roosevelt dithered. He could not decide whether to challenge Taft until late October 1911. During much of the year he assured friends he did not wish to run in 1912 but refused to endorse Taft for renomination. Keeping his options open fed the celebrity on which the former president depended. Had he come out for Taft the contest would have been over. But Roosevelt did not take any steps to prepare for a run for the nomination. As a result, he was always several steps behind the president and his organization when he did enter the race."

Read the entire article here.

Master's Thesis.

I have arrived at the beginning stages of my thesis research. I'm sure that I will face some resistance from certain professors because, unlike others in my seminar, I have elected not to focus on one or all of the "holy trinity" of race, class, and gender. I'm going to be researching the emergence of American strategic thought and its role in developing a sense of community among the U.S. Officer Corps during the antebellum and Civil War eras. This may also bring resistance from the professors because military history is frowned upon by most academic historians. I will have more updates as my research progresses.

"Security isn't a dirty word."

More from Blackadder...

Blackadder on Western Front Strategy

These clips from Blackadder Goes Forth are hilarious and, in my opinion, accurately portray strategic thought on the Western Front during World War I.

Bad Voodoo's War

I was watching Bad Voodoo's War on PBS last night. I found it very interesting and I highly recommend it. The documentary follows a platoon on a tour of duty and offers a glimpse of what ordinary soldiers experience in Iraq on a day to day basis. The entire episode can be viewed here.

Will the Republicans win in November if the Democrats carry the primary fight to their convention?

Katherine Seelye and Julie Bosman of the New York Times have sought to answer that very question:

"President Jimmy Carter and Senator Edward M. Kennedy had been sharp adversaries with a bad history, and in the 1980 presidential campaign they let it bleed into a bitter nomination fight. The Carter administration challenged Mr. Kennedy’s patriotism and refused to debate, while Mr. Kennedy dragged out their fight for nine months, all the way to the Democratic convention. A weakened Mr. Carter prevailed and won the nomination, but he went on to lose in November."

"Convention fights often spell ruin for a party. The 1980 experience for Democrats — as well as a fight in 1968, and one in 1976 for Republicans — all suggest that a bruising primary carried through the summer can contribute to defeat in November."

"Today, nervous Democrats are worried that history will repeat itself as Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, who lags in delegates and the popular vote, has refused to concede the nomination to Senator Barack Obama. Despite the increasing rancor of the campaign, Mrs. Clinton says she is staying in until the voting is over."

Read the full article here.